ABSTRACT This paper illustrates the use of priorities in process algebras by a real-world example dealing with the design of a safety-critical network which is part of a railway signaling system. Priorities in process algebras support an intuitive modeling of distributed systems since undesired interleavings can be suppressed. This fact also leads to a substantial reduction of the sizes of models. We h a ve implemented a CCS-based process algebra with priorities as a new front-end for the NCSU Concurrency Workbench, and we use model checking for verifying properties of the signaling system.
the design of a safety-critical part of a network used in British Rail's Solid State Interlocking SSI 11 , a system which controls railway signals and points. Bruns modeled and veri ed a high-level design of the system that abstracted from low-level implementation details. He used plain CCS for modeling the system, a temporal logic for specifying properties of the system, and the Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench 10 for verifying that these properties hold for the model.
We i n vestigate an elaboration of Bruns' case study using a process algebra with priorities 8 . We augment his model in two w ays based on key concepts of the SSI system described in the original design document 11 . First we add an error-recovery scheme that is invoked when a communication link fails, and second we add a backup line in order to make the system fault-tolerant. In both cases the use of priorities enables the development of elegant and intuitive models. We also show that, by eliminating invalid interleavings, priorities can dramatically cut the number of states and transitions in our systems. This is particularly signi cant since the large complexity of practical problems often prevents their automatic veri cation. We v erify our models by showing that several safety properties hold using the NCSU Concurrency Workbench. This veri cation tool is a re-implementation of the Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench that o ers similar functionality, but is faster, able to handle larger systems, and gives diagnostic information when a veri cation routine returns false.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the process algebra with priorities that we use in this paper. Section 3 gives an introduction to the railway signaling system and presents our models. Section 4 discusses our veri cation results. Finally, w e give our conclusions and directions for future work in Section 5.
A Process Algebra with Priorities
The process algebra with priorities we consider in this paper is based on the language proposed in 8 . We extend this language with a multilevel priority s c heme but disallow the prioritization and deprioritization operator. Therefore, our process algebra is basically CCS 13 where priorities, modeled by natural numbers, are assigned to actions. We use the convention that smaller numbers mean higher priorities; so 0 is the highest priority. Intuitively, visible actions represent potential synchronizations that a process may be willing to engage in with its environment. Given a choice between a synchronization on a high priority and one on a low priority, a process should choose the former.
Formally, let f k j k 2 Ng denote a family of pairwise-disjoint, countably in nite sets of labels. I n tuitively, k contains the ports" with priority k that processes may synchronize over. Then the set of actions A k with pri-ority k may be de ned by A k = df k k f k g, where k = df f j 2 k g and k = 2 k . The set of all ports and the set of all actions A are de ned by S f k j k 2 Ng and S f A k j k 2 Ng, respectively. F or better readability w e write a:k if a 2 k and :k for k . An action :k 2 k may be thought of as representing the receipt of an input on port which has priority k, while :k 2 k constitutes the deposit of an output on . The invisible actions :k represent i n ternal computation steps with priority k. In what follows, we use :k; :k ; : : :to range over A and a:k; b :k; : : :to range over . We also use :k to represent elements in A k n f :kg and extend to all visible actions :k by :k = df :k. Finally, i f L A n f :k j k 2 Ng then L = f :k j :k 2 L g. F or the sake of simplicity, w e also write 2 M where M A if :k 2 M for some k 2 N.
The syntax of our language is de ned by the following BNF. P ::= nil j :k:P j P + P j P jP P f j P nL j C def = P j P iP Here f is a relabeling, a mapping on A which satis es f :k = :k for all k 2 N and fa:k = fa:k for all a:k 2Anf :k j k 2 Ng. Moreover, a relabeling preserves priority v alues, i.e. for all a:k 2 Anf :k j k 2 Ng we h a ve fa:k = b:k for some b:k 2 k . F urther, L A n f :k j k 2 Ng, and C is a constant whose meaning is given by a de ning equation. Additionally, w e include the disabling operator i which is closely related to the corresponding operator in LOTOS 4 .
We adopt the usual de nitions for closed terms and guarded r ecursion.
We call the closed guarded terms processes. P represents the set of all processes and is ranged over by P ; Q ; : : : . Note that our framework allows an in nite number of priority levels although there is a maximum priority. The semantics of our language is given by a labeled transition system hP; A; ,!i where P is the set of processes, and ,! P A P de ned in Table 1 is the transition relation. We will write P :k ,! P 0 instead of hP; :k; P 0 i 2 , !, and we s a y that P may engage in action with priority k and thereafter behaves like process P 0 .
The presentation of the operational rules requires initial action sets which are inductively de ned on the syntax of processes, as usual. Intuitively, I k P denotes the set of all initial actions of P with priority k, I k P the set of all initial actions of P with a higher priority than k, and IP the set of all initial actions of P . Moreover, we de ne I 0 P = df ;.
Note that the initial action sets are independently de ned from the transition relation ,! ; so the transition relation is well-de ned.
Intuitively, :k:P may engage in action with priority k. The summation operator + denotes nondeterministic choice. The process P +Q may behave like process P Q i f Q P does not preempt it by performing a higher prioritized -action. The restriction operator nL prohibits the execution of actions in L L and may be seen as permitting the scoping of actions. P f = P denotes a constant de nition, i.e. C is a recursively de ned process that is a distinguished solution to the equation C = P . The side conditions of the operational semantic rules guarantee that high-priority -actions have preemptive p o wer over lowpriority actions. The reason that high-priority visible actions do not have priority o ver low-priority actions is that visible actions only indicate the potential of a synchronization, i.e. the potential of progress, whereasactions describe complete synchronizations, i.e. real progress, in our model.
The usual de nition of strong bisimulation as introduced in 13 i s a congruence relation over P 8 . In the context of our process algebra with priorities we will refer to it as prioritized strong bisimulation. In the following case study, it is sometimes useful to have visible actions that have preemptive p o wer over lower prioritized actions. More precisely, such an action, e.g. a:k, is signaling that certain events have occurred, i.e. it plays the role of an atomic proposition. W e give a:k preemptive p o wer by inserting a :k-loop at the origin states of transitions which are labeled by a:k. F or example the process a:0:P is rewritten to C def = a:0:P + :0:C . For the sake of simplicity, w e write a:0:P as a shorthand for C.
In this section we model a network used in a safety-critical railway signaling system. The basic design is adapted from 5 . However, instead of CCS we use the process algebra of Section 2 as it allows a more intuitive modeling of the system. Further, we extend the model by a n error-recovery scheme and a fault-tolerant network link in order to re ect the underlying design document 11 more precisely. Since in both cases interrupt mechanisms come into play, the use of a process algebra with priorities is needed for re ecting the design correctly.
Solid State Interlocking
Our example is embedded in British Rail's Solid State Interlocking SSI system 5, 11 , which adjusts and controls signals and points along rail routes. Its aim is to prevent situations which m a y lead to a collision or derailment of trains. Therefore, a formal veri cation of the design of the SSI and its environment is of particular importance. Figure 1 shows the basic design of the interlocking system. It consists of three di erent components: the SSI, several trackside functional modules TFM, and a high-speed link which connects the TFMs with the SSI. The SSI is the main logical unit of the system. It is connected to a control panel to which a signal operator can input her his commands. The SSI checks the validity of those commands and sends them to the TFMs along the track via the high-speed link. A TFM connects a signal or a point to the network. Its task is to listen to the network in order to receive messages for adjusting its signal or point and to send status information about the signal or point to the SSI.
The pattern of communication between the SSI and the TFMs is as follows. The SSI sends cyclically a message to each TFM. The message includes the TFM's address and the status for the corresponding signal or point e.g. signal on o . After sending a message the SSI waits a short time for the addressed TFM to respond with the current state of its signal or point. This polling scheme re ects the safety-critical design of the system since it leads to a quick detection of failures. For example, if the addressed TFM does not respond then either the TFM or the connection between the SSI and the TFM is broken. Moreover, if the corresponding signal or point has autonomously changed its state, it is forced to return to its proper state. The disadvantage of the polling scheme is its communication overhead, which necessitates an expensive high-speed network. This expense is even worse if the distance between some TFMs and the SSI is very large. Therefore, the question arises as to whether distant high-speed links can be connected via a low-grade link without violating safety requirements. Our case study will concentrate on this aspect of the SSI system since the use of a high-speed link is known to satisfy the requirements on the error-free delivery of commands and timely detection of failures 5 . The integration of a low-grade link LGL is illustrated in Figure 2 . It is connected to the SSI-side high-speed link via a SSI-side protocol converter SPC and to the TFM-side high-speed link via a TFM-side protocol converter TPC. Intuitively, the SPC is expected to behave like the TFMs on the other side of the LGL, i.e. to accept commands for those TFMs and to respond to the SSI with their current states, but the SPC occasionally sends these commands along the LGL and receives new status information about those TFMs. On the other side, the TPC should mimic a SSI. We refer to the part of the system which consists of SPC, LGL, and TPC as the slow-scan system. In order not to violate safety conditions of the overall system, the slow-scan system is expected to satisfy properties of the following kind. If the low-grade link fails, then the TPC SPC will detect the problem and stop sending messages to the TPC-side TFMs SSI. The TFMs are also expected to change signals to red and to lock points in their current setting if they stop receiving messages.
The Slow-scan Model
In the following, we formally model the slow-scan system in three steps. First, we present the system as in 5 and discuss the advantages of priorities for modeling. In the second step, we augment our model with an errorrecovery scheme and remodel the low-grade link in a full-duplex fashion. Finally, w e show h o w the required fault-tolerance of the system 11 can be re ected in our design. Tables 2 and 3 contain the model of the slow-scan system as it is accepted by the NCSU Concurrency Workbench where the symbol introduces comments. The front end of the workbench for the process algebra with priorities was generated by the process algebra compiler PAC 9 and uses the following syntactical notations for expressions: bi C P for the process algebra term C def = P , and 'a:k for the action a:k. Figure 3 shows the channels between the three parallel components of the slow-scan system; it also includes an additional clock. Since the correct behavior of our system depends on time constraints, which cannot be modeled in our process algebra directly cf. 15 , we use the clock in our model to signal the progression of time to the SPC and TPC via the channels mcs and mct, respectively.
The low-grade link is modeled by t wo parallel unidirectional links. Since we are concerned with the design of a system we c hoose a poor capacity or bandwidth link, capacity one for each direction, and we abstract from message headers and contents. Moreover, the SPC and TPC should be able to deliver a message to and get a message from the medium at any time. If no capacity in a link is left, a new message overwrites a message which is already in the medium, and an overfull error occurs. Therefore, a link behaves for each direction as an input-enabled one-place bu er. Additionally, it o ers the action 'outu to its environment if the bu er is empty. With respect to its reliability, w e assume that a link can fail because of a broken wire action 'fail wire or if its bu ering capacity is exceeded action 'fail overfull. If an error has occurred, the medium enters the error state CommF in which it only accepts messages but never delivers any messages. The states of the SPC are parameterized by a time mark. In each state the SPC is able to accept a message from the SSI action comm in and, subsequently, of responding with the appropriate status information of the requested TFM action 'stat out. At least once every clock cycle action 'mcs the SPC sends a message over the LGL to the TPC action 'c1 and increases its internal time-counter by c hanging its state from SPC0 to SPC1 or from SPC1 to SPC2. If the SPC receives a message action s2 from the TPC within two time units, it resets its internal time-counter to 0 b y c hanging its state to SPC0. Otherwise, the SPC times out action 'det and enters the failure state SPCF. In this state the SPC never sends messages to the SSI or TPC again, but it remains input-enabled.
Up to now, we h a ve not discussed how priorities can be used in modeling the system. However, one has probably already noticed that various parts of the model without priorities would be counterintuitive. For example, if a link has no capacity for an additional message, it should favor outputting a message over accepting a new one, as the latter immediately leads to the failure of the link. Similarly, a link should favor accepting a new message instead of signaling that the bu er is empty. If the clock gives a new time pulse by performing the action 'tick, it should immediately inform the SPC and TPC by performing the interrupt actions 'mcs and 'mct. In other words, no action should interfere between the actions 'tick and 'mcs and the actions 'mcs and 'mct. Moreover, the actions 'det and 'fail overfull are signaling failures which h a ve already occurred, i.e. they should not be delayed. Finally, the failing of the LGL is always possible, i.e. no action of the LGL should be able to preempt the action 'fail wire.
Based on these observations, we give the actions 'fail overfull and 'det which can be viewed as atomic propositions o verall preemptive power in our model, i.e. they are translated to 'fail overfull:0 and to 'det:0, respectively. The actions 'mcs and 'mct are also assigned the highest priority. T h us, they cannot be prevented by a n y action in the system, and the atomicity of the above mentioned action sequences is guaranteed. Moreover, in the LGL, 'out should have a higher priority than in, and in a higher one than 'outu. The action 'tick is assigned to the lowest priority level, re ecting our design decision to adopt the maximal progress assumption of real-time process algebra 15 . This assumption states that time may only proceed if the system cannot engage in a communication. Finally, 'fail wire is assigned the highest priority-level with respect to the actions of the LGL. These observations lead to the priority s c heme of actions for the slow-scan model which is summarized in the beginning of Table 2 .
The Recovery Model
The slow-scan model represents a substantial abstraction from reality since it is not capable of recovering from a failure. Therefore, we augment the slow-scan model by an error-recovery scheme. Moreover, we c hange the design of the medium to a more realistic full-duplex version. Full-duplex media have the property that if one direction fails then the other should also be considered as unreliable. In the remainder of this section, the action names of both directions of the link will only di er by a trailing prime. As long as the full-duplex medium which is modeled in Table 4 provides service, i.e. it is in one of the states Comm00, Comm10, Comm01, or Comm11, a n 'online 'ok is signaled to the environment. In contrast to the slow-scan model, a broken medium can be repaired in the recovery model. This is modeled by the action 'repaired which i s enabled in the failure state CommF and allows the LGL to reset to its initial state Comm00. The recovery of the system as modeled in Table 5 works as follows. If the SPC TPC is in its failure state SPCF TPCF and detects that the medium has been repaired by receiving the action ok online, it sends one interrupt action 'reset to the clock and another action 'init to the TPC SPC. The invoked interrupt handler of the clock resets the clock. The handler of the TPC SPC agrees to that request by sending an acknowledgment action 'ack init back to the SPC TPC, signaling its reinitialization action 'recovered, and resetting itself to its initial state. Since we are dealing with abstract models, we leave i t o p e n t o an implementation how to send interrupt signals between SPC, TPC, and the clock; e.g. one could use the already repaired line. If a link has been repaired, the system should reset itself immediately. Therefore, all actions involving the recovery scheme are interrupt actions. However, they should not be able to interfere with the atomicity of the clock signals actions 'mcs and 'mct. Therefore, the actions ok, online, init and ack init are assigned to priority level one. The action 'repaired should never be preempted by a n y communication in which the bu er is involved, so it gets the priority v alue two. Finally, the action 'recovered is handled as the other`atomic propositions' 'det and 'fail overfull.
The Fault-tolerant Model
We n o w turn our attention to modeling fault-tolerance which is an essential requirement of the SSI 11 . We h a ve already modeled an error-recovery scheme for the medium,which ensures fault-tolerance on a software-level. I n practice, the hardware of the system is also replicated in order to guarantee better safety-critical behavior 11 . Therefore, we explicitly duplicate the data path in our design. The new situation is depicted in Figure 4 , where the LGL consists of the usual link and a spare link whose corresponding actions are annotated by a prime. Our fault-tolerant model, where thè prime' states of the SPC and TPC indicate that the system works on the second line, behaves as follows. If a failure of the currently used line is detected by the SPC TPC, i.e. it is in its failure state, and the other line is`up', then the SPC TPC signals its wish to switch the line to the TPC SPC by performing the action 'switch. The interrupt handlers react on that request action 'ack switch in the same fashion as in the recovery model. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the necessary changes to our model. Ideally, w e assume the switch to be atomic in the design of the slowscan system, i.e. SPC and TPC switch to the new link at the same time. Using priorities, this can be modeled by giving the actions switch and ack switch the same priority as the interrupt actions init, ack init, and ok. 
State Space of the Models
We h a ve run the NCSU Concurrency Workbench on a SUN SPARC 2 0 workstation to construct and minimize the state spaces of our models. We refer to the slow-scan model as bruns.pccs, to the recovery model as recovery.pccs, and to the fault-tolerant model as ftolerant.pccs. Moreover, we refer to the slow-scan model where the bu er has been replaced by the full-duplex version as basic.pccs. The CCS models corresponding to bruns.pccs and basic.pccs, which are obtained by leaving out all priority values, are called bruns.ccs and basic.ccs, respectively. T able 8 provides for each model the number of states and transitions of the corresponding transition system and the time in seconds needed for constructing it. The table also contains this information for the minimized with respect to prioritized strong bisimulation models cf. reduced state space". Table 8 shows that the number of states decreases by o ver 70 when using the calculus with priorities. Even more impressive is the reduction of transitions by approximately 85. This results from the fact that we are not able to model the atomicity of action sequences and interrupts in plain CCS. That observation demonstrates the utility of priorities for the veri cation of distributed systems. The large reduction of the fault-tolerant model with respect to prioritized strong bisimulation is due to the symmetry of its design. The minimization of bruns.ccs and basic.ccs with respect to observational equivalence reduces the model to 2057 states 8280 transitions and 698 states 2293 transitions, respectively. W e are currently implementing an algorithm to compute prioritized observational equivalence. The adaption of the corresponding observational equivalence 14 i s n o t suitable for automated veri cation tools since the weak transition relation is parameterized with arbitrary sets of actions. However, we h a ve developed a characterization of the prioritized observational equivalence which uses an alternative w eak transition relation that is e ciently computable.
Verifying the Railway System
In this section, we specify and verify requirements of the slow-scan, the recovery, and the fault-tolerant model. We use the well-known modalcalculus 12 as our speci cation language and determine the validity o f our properties by model checking 3 . For the veri cation, we use the NCSU Concurrency Workbench on a SUN SPARC 2 0 w orkstation with 512 MByte of main memory.
Requirements of the Slow-Scan System
Since the slow-scan system is embedded in a safety-critical system, we w ant to verify that our designs satisfy the following required properties. After a low-grade link fails, either the slow-scan system will eventually detect the error or the link is repaired. Moreover, this property holds after every reinitialization of the system.
The slow-scan system is always capable of continuing to tick. If this property holds, then the system is deadlock-free, t o o .
A failure of the slow-scan system is possible. This property should also be valid after every reinitialization of the system. A failure is detected only if a failure has actually occurred. Also this property should hold after every reinitialization of the system.
After a low-grade link fails, the slow-scan system will eventually stop responding to the SSI and TFMs if the low-grade link does not recover from the error.
If a failure is detected and the broken line is repaired, then the system will be reinitialized.
All properties except for the last one are adapted from 5 . However, since the recovery and the fault-tolerant model are able to recover from an error, the properties of 5 should also hold after every reinitialization of these models.
Specifying our Requirements in the -Calculus
For specifying our requirements we use the modal -calculus. Its syntax is de ned by the following BNF, which uses a set of variables V with X 2 V . We use the well-known standard semantics of the modal -calculus as e.g. presented in 12 . The model checker integrated in the NCSU Concurrency Workbench is based on 3 . More precisely, i t i s a local model checker for a fragment of the modal -calculus. The formulae we i n tend to verify can be automatically rewritten into semantical equivalent ones which satisfy the syntactic restriction required in 3 . The time and space complexity of the model checker is linear in the size of the formula, in its alternation depth, and in the size of the transition system.
We n o w formally specify the requirements of the slow-scan system as presented above in the modal -calculus. We take particular care in implementing eventuality since we w ant to consider only execution paths in which the clock continues to tick. This fairness property is not satis ed by the models themselves since they contain livelocks. As discussed in 5 , we are interested in the following notion of fair eventuality:
Moreover, we need a meta-formula which expresses that the argument formula holds again if the low-grade system has recovered: again = df , Now, we can formalize the desired properties of the slow-scan model and the fault-tolerant model, where Fail = df ffail wire; fail overfullg.
After the low-grade link fails for the rst time, the slow-scan system will eventually detect the error or the link is repaired:
failures The body of the formula re ects that fail overfull signals that a failure has already occurred, i.e. it may be enabled at the same time as det. Moreover, the formula no-false-alarms should hold after every reinitialization of the system: no-false-alarms-again = df againno-false-alarms : 7 The auxiliary property the system never responds", which is used below, can be encoded as follows:
After a low-grade link fails, the slow-scan system will eventually be silent if the low-grade link does not recover from the error:
eventually-silent = df , 1 det evensilent _ h recovereditt : 8
If a failure is detected and the broken line is repaired, then the system will be reinitialized:
react-on-repair = df , 1 det ,recovered 1 repaired evenhrecovereditt : 9 
Veri cation Results
We applied the model checker for all models and formulae twice. The rst time, we let the model checker construct the state space on the y as is usual for local model checking. The second time, before invoking the model checker, we minimized the models with respect to prioritized strong bisimulation. The veri cation results are given in Tables 9 10 and 11 12, respectively. The tables show which properties hold for which formulae columns ok" and give the CPU time in seconds used by the NCSU Concurrency Workbench for checking each formula. The symbol ?" indicates that a computation ran out of memory. The speed-up of the model checker for minimized models is partly due to the fact that the transition systems for our models were constructed in a preprocessing step minimization and, thus, are not constructed on the y. Additionally, the times for the verication results with respect to our minimized models do not include the times needed for the minimizations. In contrast to 5 , we could verify most properties automatically and without using any abstractions by hand. However, the formulae eventuallysilent, react-on-repair, and failures-responded-again are complicated and large in size. Therefore, we could not check them automatically for the model ftolerant.pccs, which has 7485 states and 26164 transitions after minimization. Although the size of bruns.ccs is relatively small, the model checker ran out of memory for the formula eventually-silent, which has alternation depth two. Moreover, our timing results show that using a local model checker often gains no advantage. This is because most of the formulae are valid safety properties, and the local model checker has to investigate all states of the models anyway. H o wever, our model checker has quickly detected invalid formulae.
In the prioritized models all properties that could be veri ed automatically hold as expected. The formula no-false-alarms does not hold for the models in plain CCS. This is due to the fact that the atomicity of actions cannot be expressed without priorities. Indeed, there exists an interleaving in the CCS models where one observes a 'det before a failure has occurred. Surprisingly, w e found the formula failures-responded invalid in the model bruns.ccs whereas in 5 it is reported to hold. The reason for this is that we left out the actions c1' s1' which occur directly before a 'det in Bruns' model. Although that re ects our intuition that a 'det should be signaled as soon as an error is detected, Bruns' modeling does not allow both SPC and TPC to detect the overfull-failure of the medium before the action 'fail overfull has occurred.
Conclusions and Future Work
We h a ve demonstrated the importance of priorities for modeling and verifying distributed systems by means of a practically relevant case study of the slow-scan part of a railway signaling system. Priorities allow u s t o f avor one communication over another and to make action sequences atomic. While the former helps to model systems more realistically, the latter drastically cuts the number of states and transitions. Our models explicitly reect safety-critical parts of the slow-scan system, namely an error-recovery scheme and a fault-tolerant medium, which are required in the design document 11 . We h a ve used the NCSU Concurrency Workbench for checking properties of our design. We are currently implementing an algorithm for computing prioritized observational equivalence that will enable us to further reduce the size of our models.
